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$EVWUDFWstandard attempts to explain the phenomenon of decaying contribution in
repeated linear public goods games are based on a ‘representative agent’ approach, with
either selfish or altruist agents and an ‘error’ component. In this paper we try to test by
purely experimental means the alternative hypothesis that in experimental public goods
games there are at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators.
We try to identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then
play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (1) the average
contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in
groups of ‘pure’ free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players
the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.
JEL Classification: H41, C92.
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2 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
‘Overcontribution’ in linear Public Goods (PG) experiments is by now a well-established
phenomenon. It also established that the level of contribution tends to diminish with
repetition. This phenomenon of declining contribution is sometimes referred to as
‘decay’. However, overcontribution does not disappear completely, even after up to 60
rounds (cf. Ledyard 1995).
Standard theory assumes perfectly rational self-interested individuals, and rules out any
contribution to the public good. In order to explain the anomaly, some scholars have
focused on DOWUXLVP as the main explanation of overcontribution. Altruism, however,
leaves the decay phenomenon unexplained. Some recent work tries to combine the
‘altruism’ explanation with an HUURUDQGOHDUQLQJhypothesis. Palfrey and Prisbey (1996,
1997) and Anderson et al. (1998), for example, modify the standard economic model by
means of an ‘altruism’ parameter together with a stochastic component. The decay of
contribution is thus interpreted as a process of error-elimination, or ‘discovery’ of the
structure of the game, or of one’s ‘true’ preferences.1
A distinctive characteristic of such models is their neglect of any interaction between
players: altruism and learning are supposed to work the same way for each subject
regardless of the behaviour of the other players in the PG game. Another approach, based
on a plausible psychological hypothesis, is that the decision to contribute is affected by
the context of the game, and in particular by the behaviour of the other members of the
experimental group. ‘Reciprocating players’ contribute if and only if (some of) the others
do the same. They may, in particular, link their level of contribution to the average
contribution of the group – hence the well-known phenomenon of ‘splitting’ (contributing
a sum between Nash and the social optimum). Part of the decay phenomenon, then, could
be due to the presence of reciprocators who are prompted by the context, e.g. the presence
of some free riders, to slide towards self-interested behaviour.
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 This approach has the advantage of promising a unified account of a number of ‘similar’ experimental
phenomena, such as convergence to efficient equilibria in double-oral auctions and reduction of
intransitivities in repeated preference reversal experiments (cf. Plott 1995).
3Despite several attempts in this direction, reciprocating agents turn out to be remarkably
difficult to model.2 Their existence, and their relevance for the decay of overcontribution,
can however be established in a non-theoretical way, by purely experimental means.
Suppose that – contrary to standard economic theory and to the models of altruism plus
error cited above – the decay phenomenon resulted from the combination of different
types of players. Suppose the experimental sample were composed by ‘pure’ free riders
and ‘pure’ cooperators, as well as by reciprocators willing to give conditional on the
others’ contribution. An important implication of this scenario (the ‘heterogeneous agents
hypothesis’3) is that it makes decay dependent on the composition of the experimental
groups. If there are enough free riders in the experimental population, uniformly
distributed across the groups, the decay phenomenon gets triggered. But if we could
somehow isolate free riders from players with a cooperative or reciprocating attitude, then
we should observe a quick decay towards Nash in groups of free riders, vs. a more stable
contribution rate in groups made up entirely of reciprocators and/or ‘pure’ cooperators.
In this paper we report an experiment aimed at testing the heterogeneous agents
hypothesis. We implement a within-subjects design where the same individuals
participate first in a repeated linear PG experiment with groups of KHWHURJHQHRXV
subjects, and then in a repeated linear PG experiment with KRPRJHQHRXV groups. The
hypothesis implies that in the second experiment contribution will be much lower in
groups of free riders than in groups of (‘pure’ or ‘conditional’) cooperators, and that
reciprocators will mutually support their level of contribution. The higher rate of
contribution in groups of cooperators and in groups of reciprocators will at least partly
compensate for the lower rate of contribution in groups of free-riders. Unless free riders
constitute the majority of the population, therefore, we should observe a higher overall
rate of contribution in the second than in the first experiment.
The most difficult task in running such an experiment is to identify and classify subjects
according to ‘types’. In this experiment we have combined four sources of evidence: the
                                                
2
 Cf. Sugden (1984), Rabin (1993), Levine (1998); see also Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) for a general
discussion.
3
 This hypothesis has a long history in economic and social psychology (see e.g. Johnson and Nohrem-
Hebeisem 1979, Webley et al. 1988)  but has entered the economics literature only recently; its
implications and relevance has been pointed out with respect to various policy issues by Hekcman
(2001a, 2001b). Recent economic experimental evidence on PG games pointing in this direction
includes Andreoni (1995b), Burlando and Webley (1999), Offerman et al. (1996), Weiman (1994),.
4‘Strategy Method’ used by Fischbacher et al. (2001), the ‘Decomposed Game Technique’
used by Offerman et al. (1996), various measures of behaviour in a repeated linear PG
game (along the lines of Burlando & Webley, 1999), and a questionnaire. Section 2 is
devoted to illustrating these techniques and the experimental design in general. Section 3
contains the results of the experiment, and section 4 concludes.
([SHULPHQWDOGHVLJQ
The experiment was run at the University of Trento (Italy) in May 2002, and involved 92
subjects (mostly, but not entirely, undergraduates from the School of Economics and
Business). The subjects were recruited by means of flyers, and were asked to come to the
laboratory twice, with exactly a one-week interval between the first and the second
session.4 Overall subjects spent about 80 minutes in the lab (about 50 for the first session
and 30 for the second one) and earned on average 20.50 Euros5. The experiment was run
entirely by computerised means, with up to 20 subjects sitting in the same room, in front
of terminals isolated by means of partitions.6 The experimental currency was expressed in
‘tokens’, with 1 token = 1 cent of Euro. The first session consisted of four different tasks.
The subjects were allocated randomly to terminals, and provided with a sheet of
instructions for the first task. Each subject was instructed to press a key when she had
finished reading the instructions; when all the subjects had done so, the experimenter
asked if anybody wanted to ask any question. Then, the first experiment began. (The
same procedure was followed before each experimental task.)
6HVVLRQWDVN6WUDWHJ\0HWKRG
The so-called ‘Strategy Method’ was first used by Fischbacher et al. (2001) in an attempt
to observe the phenomenon of reciprocation (or ‘conditional cooperation’) directly. The
environment for this task is a linear PG game with payoff function
∑
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 Subjects were told in advance that payment was strictly conditional on participating to both sessions, and
that earnings from both sessions would be paid immediately after the second one. Those who didn’t show up
at the second session lost their earnings from the first session, and their data were disregarded.
5
 This is more than what an average Italian student can earn in a part-time job.
6
 The software for the experiment was created by Marco Tecilla at CEEL.
5where 200 is the total number of tokens to be shared between a ‘private’ (200 – J) and a
‘public’ account (J).7 Once subjects have been made familiar with the situation, they are
asked to take two types of decision: first, they are asked to make an ‘unconditional
contribution’, i.e. to decide how much they would like to contribute in a standard one-
shot PG game where each player, at the moment of taking her decision, doesn’t know
how much the other players have contributed. Secondly, subjects are asked to fill in a
(conditional) ‘contribution table’, i.e. to indicate how much they ZRXOG be willing to
contribute LI they knew that the other members of their group had, on average, contributed
to the public good a given amount. This question is iterated, varying the amount
hypothetically contributed by the ‘others’ (in discrete intervals) from 0 to 200. In other
words, subjects are asked to make a series of ‘conditional contributions’ in addition to the
unconditional one just indicated. Clearly the data from the ‘contribution table’ are
particularly useful in order to identify reciprocating players. Participants know that after
the decisions have been made subjects will be randomly allocated to groups of 4 players,
one of which will be selected at random as the one who will actually play the conditional
contribution task, based on the other three players' unconditional decisions. The actual
rewards are then calculated (and communicated to the players) according to the payoff
function above. This way, both decisions (conditional and unconditional) are made
relevant for the final result, and monetary incentives are provided for all members of the
group.8
6HVVLRQWDVN’HFRPSRVHG*DPH
The Decomposed Game technique has been widely used by psychologists and (more
recently) economists in order to measure attitudes towards cooperation. Subjects are
asked to make 24 choices between pairs of allocations. Each subject knows that she has
been paired with another participant who will remain the same, but unknown, throughout
the game. Each allocation consists of a number of tokens paid to yourself and another
sum paid to the other player. The token amounts can be positive or negative. A typical
choice may involve, e.g., a combination A = (75, -130) vs. B = (39, -145), where one
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 In this phase we used (with minor adaptations) instructions and control questions provided by Urs
Fischbacher, whom we would like to thank. With respect to the Fischbacher et al. experiment we raised the
marginal payoff function of contributions to the public goods from 0.4 to 0.5 tokens. After the unconditional
contribution task, we also asked subjects ‘how much do you think the other members of the group have
contributed to the public good, on average?’
8
 See Fischbaher et al. (2001) for a more detailed analysis of this procedure. Unlike in the original one, in
our experiment the random selection mechanism was run by the computer itself.
6must choose between gaining either 75 or 39 tokens, with related losses on the other’s
part of either 130 or 145 tokens. The total sum (‘own’ plus ‘other’) allocated is not
constant over the 24 combinations. (The full list of A, B combinations is standard and can
be found in Appendix 1.) There is no feedback concerning the other’s choices, until all
participants have finished this task. The final payoff is obtained by combining the 24
choices of each subject with those of the other player.9
At the end of the experiment we take the 24 vectors chosen by each subject and add them
up to obtain his or her own ‘motivational vector’. We use the standard classification
criteria used in the previous literature:10 the motivational vector is placed on the standard
‘value orientation circle’ (see Appendix 1) and classified accordingly. The length of the
motivational vector is used as a measure of a subject’s consistency. A perfectly consistent
subject (i.e. a subject who always chooses the alternative lying closest to her own
motivational vector) should have a vector length of 300. Subjects with a vector length of
150 or less (less than 50% of the maximal length) thus display a considerable degree of
inconsistency or confusion.
6HVVLRQWDVN5HSHDWHGOLQHDU3*H[SHULPHQWKHWHURJHQHRXVJURXSV
The third task is a repeated linear PG experiment, with the same payoff function as in the
first task (the Strategy Method), except that the individual endowment at each round is 20
tokens instead of 200. A new set of instructions reminds subjects about the environment,
and states clearly that the groups (of 4 players) will be different from those of tasks one
and two. The PG game will be played for 23 rounds, with the first three rounds for
training (the payoffs do not count) and 20 rounds for real. After each round the subjects
are given feedback about their total earnings, their earnings in the previous round, and the
average contribution level of their group. The number of rounds that have already been
played is displayed at the bottom of the screen.
                                                
9
 For example: suppose subject L accumulates a total payoff of 500 (‘own’) and allocates to the ‘other’ a total
payoff of 100; his counterpart M, in contrast, accumulates a total payoff of 550 (‘own’) and allocates to the
other a total payoff of –40. In the end, L gets 500–40=460, whereas M receives 550+100=650 tokens.
10
 Cf. Griesinger and Livingston (1973), Liebrand (1984), Offerman et al. (1996).
76HVVLRQWDVN4XHVWLRQQDLUH
Before leaving the room, subjects were required to fill in a questionnaire (on their PCs).
The first four questions were open, with enough space to write an articulate answer: (1)
“What were you trying to do in the experiment (in other words: what were your goals of
objectives)?” (2) “Did you achieve your objectives?” (3) “What were the other members
of your group trying to do (what were their objectives)?” (4) “What was the scope of this
experiment (in other words, what were the experimenters trying to discover)?”
Then, each subject was asked to indicate her level of agreement with four statements, on a
1-7 scale: (5) “This experiment requires a great concentration effort”; (6) “The rules of
the game were explained clearly and were understandable”; (7) “In this experiment one
must try to work together with others, in order to have everyone end up with more
money”; (8) “In this experiment, everyone’s earnings depend on the decisions of all
members of the group”. The relevant questions for us were (1), (2), (3), and (7). Question
(7) was used by Brandts and Schram (2001) as an indicator of individual attitude towards
cooperation; by means of the first three questions (taken from Burlando and Webley,
1999) we hoped to collect useful data about the strategies implemented during the first
three tasks of the experiment.
&ODVVLILFDWLRQFULWHULD
We used data from the four tasks described above in order to classify individual players.
For the purposes of our research, we needed to divide our subjects into three main
categories: free riders (F), cooperators (C), and reciprocators (R). However, in order to
account for ambiguous or borderline cases we also formed a residual group of ‘noisy’
players (N) (or, more precisely, subjects with ‘noisy’ data that are not easily
interpretable).
Given that the ultimate goal of our research is to predict behaviour in a repeated PG
game, we decided to put more weight on the data collected in the repeated PG game task
of Session 1. The classification of players within the repeated PG experiment is a
complex matter, as it should take into account various aspects of behaviour. The obvious
parameter to start from is the simple average individual contribution over the 20 rounds
played ‘for real’ (IA). This measure of course is the variable under examination and
8hence is unable to explain itself, but nevertheless can be legitimately used for
taxonomic/predictive purposes.11 A more serious problem is that IA is likely to depend on
group behaviour: a subject with an average low contribution, for instance, may be either a
pure free rider, or a reciprocator which happens to be in a group of free riders. Similarly,
a high average contribution may signal either a pure cooperator, or a reciprocator in a
group of reciprocating/cooperating players. Hence, IA needs to be complemented with a
second parameter: its difference with respect to average group contribution (DA).
In interpreting PG data we follow a two-steps algorithm. Our algorithm for IA is:
(1) C or R if IA > 12;
(2) R if 12 ≥ IA ≥ 8;
(3) F or R if IA < 8.
Whenever we face an ambiguous case (1 or 3 above), we use the second measure, the
difference between individual and group average contribution (AD). The algorithm in this
case is:
(4) C if DA ≥ 1;
(5) R if –1 < DA < 1;
(6) F if DA ≤ –1.
The Decomposed Game provides a tight classification of subjects into 5 categories,
according to where the ‘motivational vector’ is placed on the ‘value orientation circle’.
They are: ‘aggressive’ if it lies between degree –112.5 and –67.5; ‘competitive’ if
between –67.5 and –22.5; ‘individualistic’ if between –22.5 and 22.5; ‘reciprocating’ if
between 22.5 and 67.5; ‘cooperative’ if between 67.5 and 112.5. 12 For our purposes, we
aggregated subjects belonging to the first three categories (‘aggressive’, ‘competitive’ and
‘individualistic’) into one single category, that of ‘free riders’. Subjects with a low level
of coherence (below 50%) were classified as ‘noisy’.
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 In this respect, our research differs from previous attempts to observe individual attitudes or motives in
PG-like environments (e.g. Offerman et al. 1996; Brantds and Schram 2001; Andreoni 1995a). Our
categories are more ‘behavioural’ and less psychological in character than those used in those studies.
12
 Notice that here, and everywhere else throughout this paper, our use of the terms ‘reciprocator’ and
‘cooperator’ differs from the conventional terminology in the standard literature on the decomposed game.
We use the term ‘reciprocation’ (or ‘conditional cooperation’) where the standard literature uses the term
9The Strategy Method provides two main parameters: the conditional contribution table
and the unconditional contribution. We decided to classify as ‘reciprocators’ all players
whose conditional contribution functions approximate the ‘perfect reciprocation
function’, with a margin of variation of ±10%. For example: a player willing to contribute
0 if the others contribute 0, 0 if they contribute 1, 1 if they contribute 2, 2 if the contribute
3, and so on, would be classified as a reciprocator (albeit with a slight ‘individualistic’
bias). In contrast, a subject willing to give 0 if the others give 0, 0 if they give 1, 0 if they
give 2, 0 if they give 3, 1 if they give 4, 2 if they give 5, and so on, would count as a free
rider according to our classification. (A symmetrical criterion is used in order to identify
cooperators.)
Although the great majority of conditional contribution functions display a coherent
pattern (they are either flat or increasing with the group contribution-level), some seem to
follow random walks and some other non-easily interpretable patterns.13 We classified
cases like this as ‘noisy’. The conditional contribution table was then compared with the
unconditional contribution of the same subject. The idea is that subjects classified as
‘cooperative’ according to the conditional contribution table should give high
unconditional contributions, and the opposite should hold for free riders. The behaviour
of reciprocators, as usual, is more difficult to pin down, for their unconditional
contribution will depend decisively on their expectations about the members of their
group. Here we relied on their answer to the question: ‘how much do you think the other
members of the group have contributed, on average?’ which was inserted between the
unconditional and the conditional contribution tasks. For genuine reciprocators, the
answer to the latter question should be highly correlated with the unconditional
contribution. Free riders and ‘pure’ cooperators, in contrast, should act pretty much
independently of their expectations on others’ behaviour. When these simple rules were
violated, the subject was labeled as ‘noisy’.
Finally, we used evidence from the questionnaire to complement the data from the three
previous tasks. Questionnaires are not highly valued in experimental economics, but we
                                                                                                                                           
‘cooperation’ and we use ‘cooperation’ for behaviour that is there termed ‘altruistic’. This is more in line
with the terminology used in the other games.
13
 A significant portion of subjects display puzzling ‘hump-shaped’ functions: their contribution grows with
the group contribution up to a point (typically, 50% of the tokens), and then declines towards zero. See also
Fischbacher et al. (2001).
10
found them of some use as an aid in the interpretation of the PG game evidence.14 The
questionnaire included subjects’ own SRVWKRF explanation (rationalisation) of the
strategies they followed in the repeated PG task. The answers being ‘open’, the quality of
the data varied from subject to subject.15
Once this preliminary round of classification had been completed, every single subject
was provided with four labels, one for each task. Overall, there was a remarkable degree
of convergence between the four classification tasks, but obviously several cases of
disagreement (on one or more dimensions) remained. In order to resolve them, we
assigned weights to the four classification methods. As anticipated, we gave priority to
the PG game data, according to the following formula:
Repeated PG game: 40%
Strategy Method: 20%
Decomposed Game: 20%
Questionnaire 20%.
When no classification reached the 50% level (and therefore in all cases of tie) we
assigned the subject to the ‘noisy’ group (N).
([DPSOHDQGPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLVFXVVLRQ
In order to give an idea of the classification process as a whole, we shall here illustrate
one particular instance taken from our experimental data. The behaviour of subject
number 51 in the PG game, vis-à-vis the average contribution level of the members of her
group, is represented in Figure 1. Her individual contribution is almost invariably below
the group average – Subject 51 was pretty clearly free riding. (Quantitatively, IA = 3.15
and DA = –3.55.) In the Decomposed Game, the subject emerged as a ‘competitive’
individual (hence a ‘free rider’ in our terminology), but with a low level of coherence
(35%). As a consequence we classified her as ‘noisy’ in this task. The data from the
Strategy Method, conditional contribution task, are represented in Figure 2. The
conditional contribution function lies inequivocally below the 45% (or ‘perfect
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 We don’t believe, in other words, that questionnaire data can be used as the only or even primary
source of evidence, but often they allowed to discriminate between, say, a ‘mild’ cooperator and a
‘noisy’ player, or between a cooperator and a reciprocator, etc.
11
reciprocation’) line. This is confirmed by the other two parameters of the Strategy
Method: the subject expected other players to contribute on average 100 tokens, but she
herself contributed (in the ‘unconditional’ task) only 50. According to this classification
criterion, she is a free rider. Finally, Subject 51 gave the following answer to the question
‘What were you trying to achieve in this game?’:
“My main objective was to invest little money in the project so as to obtain a sure
gain from the money I had put in the individual account and also to benefit from
the gains obtained from the project thanks to the investments made by the other
components of the group.”
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
So, to sum up, Subject 51 was classified in the following way:
PG Game: Free rider (40%)
Decomposed Game: Noisy (20%)
Strategy Game: Free rider (20%)
Questionnaire: Free rider (20%)
Aggregate classification: Free rider.
Of course other cases were less straightforward than this one but, as we shall see very
shortly, our algorithms seem with hindsight to have performed quite well. This is indeed
an important methodological point, which is worth articulating in more detail. As we said
in the introduction to this paper, our main objective is to test the ‘heterogeneous agents
hypothesis’ even in the absence of a formal model of reciprocating players. Obviously,
working without a formal model means that the classification criteria that we use must
necessarily be ‘ad hoc’ and lack a rigorous theoretical foundation. However, the criteria
themselves can receive support from the experimental evidence: if the criteria were totally
arbitrary or ill-defined, we should not expect to find any significant difference between
the levels of cooperation in Session 1 (with ‘heterogeneous’ groups) and in Session 2
(with ‘homogeneous’ groups). To see why, imagine an extreme case in which our
classification criteria failed completely: every WUXH cooperator, say, would have an equal
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 Many answers were simply too short or too obscure to be of any use. In order to control as much as
possible for our own interpretative bias, we separately evaluated the answers and classified subjects
12
chance of being assigned to any of the four groups (F, C, R, N). This would amount to a
mere random reallocation of the subjects to different groups, and therefore we should
expect in Session 2 to observe the same phenomenon of decaying overcontribution as in
Session 1. In contrast, the stronger the difference between the two sessions, the more our
(admittedly ad hoc) classification criteria turn out to be corroborated.
Another piece of evidence corroborating the classification criteria is the convergence of
their results. As microbiologists know very well, it is not necessary that we are 100%
confident in the reliability of a microscope in order to obtain valid empirical data. We can
use different instruments (e.g., a light microscope, an electronic microscope, etc.) to
observe the same specimen and then use an argument from coincidence of the following
sort: it would be a true miracle if all these different instruments reported the same,
mistaken, phenomenon. Their convergence suggests that the phenomenon must be real,
rather than an artefact of the observation procedure. Our use of different classification
techniques followed the same logic (a procedure sometimes called ‘triangulation’).
As a matter of fact, we did observe a highly significant difference in the contribution
patterns of Sessions 1 and 2 in our experiment (as we shall see in detail in the next
session); and we did observe a remarkable convergence between the different methods of
classification. Hence, we can conclude with a high degree of confidence that the
classification procedure did the job.
6HVVLRQ5HSHDWHGOLQHDU3*H[SHULPHQWKRPRJHQHRXVJURXSV
All subjects were classified during the week that elapsed between Session 1 and Session
2. The number of subjects falling in each category is shown in Table 1.
Free riders Reciprocators Cooperators Noisy Total
N 29 32 17 14 92
7DEOH&ODVVLILFDWLRQ
As expected the numbers in each category are not multiples of four, which caused some
inconvenience in creating new homogeneous groups. In order to achieve maximum
                                                                                                                                           
accordingly; then, we compared our results and resolved the (rare) cases of disagreement.
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homogeneity and not to lose too many subjects, we devised a system of substitutes to
replace subjects who might unexpectedly fail to show up at Session 2. Eventually, we
managed to create 6 groups of free riders, 6 groups of reciprocators, 4 groups of
cooperators, and 3 groups of ‘noisy’ players. We also formed two non-homogeneous
groups by matching the remaining players. One group turned out to be made of three
reciprocators and one free rider (as we shall see, the results from this group are quite
surprising); the other group of one free rider, two reciprocators, and one ‘noisy’ player.
For obvious reasons, these non-homogenous groups will not be considered in the main
process of data-analysis below. Eight subjects (three free riders, three reciprocators, one
cooperator, and one ‘noisy’ player) did not participate in Session 2, either because they
failed to show up, or because there were no other players available to match them with.16
Three days after the first session subjects were contacted individually (by email) and
confirmed the exact time of the second experimental session. When they arrived, subjects
were allocated individually to their own terminal. The instructions were identical to those
of session 1, task 3, except that it was made clear that the composition of the groups
differed from that of the first session. Once again, we let them play 3 rounds for training
and 20 for real. At the end of the experiment we added their earnings from both sessions,
converted into Euros, and paid them accordingly.
5HVXOWV
The core of our analysis is based on the behaviour of 64 subjects: 4 groups of
cooperators, 6 of free riders, and 6 of reciprocators. (Towards the end of this section,
however, we shall also comment briefly on the behaviour of ‘noisy’ players and on the
two non-homogeneous groups.) The main predictions of the heterogeneous agents
hypothesis turn out to be corroborated: (1) in the second PG game the average level of
contribution is significantly higher than in the first one; (2) in the second PG game groups
of (‘pure’ and ‘conditional’) cooperators display a very high and fairly constant level of
contribution. In groups of free riders, in contrast, the contribution starts lower and quickly
jumps to a low level, reaching in the last round the expected Nash equilibrium of zero
contribution.
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 The subjects who did not show up in both sessions were not paid at all. Those who did show up but could
not participate in the experiment in Session 2, received their earnings from Session 1, plus a flat fee equal to
14
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The first result is apparent from Figure 3: the average contribution level in Session 2 is
always above that of Session 1. Statistically, the hypothesis that the two sets of data
(contribution in the PG Game, Session 1, and contribution in the PG Game, Session 2)
come from the same population is rejected at the 1% level in all rounds but six, where it is
rejected at 5% (Wilcoxon signed ranks test).  The question then arises of which subjects
effectively contributed to the upward shift of the contribution curve. Table 2 show that
reciprocators are mostly responsible for the shift: on average, their contribution moved
from 10.4 to 18.6 tokens. This abrupt increase is to be expected in the light of the
heterogeneous agents hypothesis. What the hypothesis does not necessarily imply is that
cooperators should also raise their contribution level once placed in homogenoeus groups
(+1.5), nor that free riders should end up free riding more (–2.3).  One plausible
explanation for this is that our groups of cooperators and free riders were ‘infiltrated’ by a
certain amount of reciprocators – i.e. they were less ‘pure’ than we wanted them to be. In
the case of free riders, it is also likely that in the first session some of them played
strategically, trying to profit by contributing less than the group average but still above
the Nash equilibrium (in order not to discourage others’ contributions too early in the
game). In the second session, they might have quickly realised that such a strategy was
not profitable, and provoked a more rapid decay.
Session 1 Session 2
Cooperators (N=16) 14.91 16.45
Reciprocators (N=24) 10.38 18.65
Free riders (N=24) 5.03 2.71
7DEOH$YHUDJHFRQWULEXWLRQLQWKHUHSHDWHG3*JDPH
Figures 4 (a, b, c), 5 and 6 show the average contribution of each type of player during
the 20 rounds of play, in Sessions 1 and 2. Notice how in Session 1 (Figure 5) the
contribution level of reciprocators is placed between that of free riders and cooperators,
but then shifts up to the top of the graph in Session 2 (Figure 6). Part of the explanation is
that in Session 2 the variance is greater among cooperators (which is probably due to the
                                                                                                                                           
the average earnings of the other players in Session 2.
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fact that we were not terribly successful in forming homogeneous groups for this
category).
[FIGURES 3 (a, b, c), 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE]
As was to be expected, in Session 2 free riders start with a lower level of contribution,
which tends to decay very quickly (the average is 5 tokens after only two rounds) and
never manages to recover. Cooperators and reciprocators start with a very high level of
contribution, which remains high throughout most of the game. The behaviour of
reciprocators is particularly impressive, with constant (and almost full) contribution until
round 19. There is evidence of an ‘end-effect’ (Andreoni, 1988; Keser, 1996) in the last
3-4 rounds, with abrupt decay to a level of about 12 tokens. (Such an ‘end-effect’,
incidentally, explains why the difference between the contribution levels in the first and
second session is greater in the middle of the game – cf. Figure 3.) The presence of an end
effect in reciprocating players casts further doubts on the explanations based on pure
altruism. Many reciprocating players do defect at the end of the game, which suggests
that their behaviour is indeed prompted either by selfish motives or at least by fear of
being exploited. It is likely that reciprocators do not consider the equilibrium strategy to
be rational (they probably cannot bring the backward induction argument to its radical
and counterintuitive consequences.)
We ran a Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test on the contribution in the second session
of the four samples (free riders, reciprocators, cooperators, and ‘noisy’players). The
results, summarised in Table 3, show that the hypothesis that the four samples of data
come from the same generation mechanism can be rejected with near certainty. We
also ran Mann-Whitney tests on pairs (free riders vs. cooperators, cooperators vs.
reciprocators, etc.), and the results are as expected (see Table 4). The difference
between free riders and, respectively, cooperators and reciprocators, is highly
significant (it passes the test at the 1% level in DOO rounds). As expected, the difference
in behaviour of cooperators and reciprocators in the second session is small and the
two groups cannot be easily distinguished .
16
 Rd1 rd2  rd3  rd4  rd5  rd6  rd7  rd8  rd9 rd10 rd11 rd12 rd13 rd14 rd15 rd16 rd17 rd18 rd19 rd20
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
7DEOH.UXVNDO:DOOLVWHVWRQDOOJURXSV)&516HVVLRQDV\PSWRWLFVLJQLILFDQFH
rd1 rd2 rd3 rd4 rd5 rd6 rd7 rd8 rd9 rd10 rd11Rd1
2
rd13 rd14Rd1
5
rd16 rd17 rd18 rd19rd20
C vs F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .002
C vs R .467 .570 .968 .885 .682 .517 .644 .375 .435 .435 .500 .781 .404 .781 .552 .926 .227 .295 .188 .721
F vs R .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
7DEOH0DQQ:KLWQH\WHVW6HVVLRQH[DFWVLJQLILFDQFH
We haven’t said much about ‘noisy’ players. In fact, it is difficult to characterise them
except for the fact that their choices show a much greater variance than those of the other
groups17. On average their contribution levels are above those of free riders in both
sessions, and below those of cooperators. This is not surprising, given that the ‘noisy’
group was used as a ‘catch-all’ and therefore probably included players of all types. The
two non-homogeneous groups engaged in fairly strange behaviour, which we cite only for
curiosity and the sake of completeness. The group composed of three reciprocators and
one free rider managed to sustain a decent level of cooperation – below the average of
reciprocators but well above that of free riders. The group composed of two reciprocators,
one noisy player and one cooperator displayed an even lower, and swinging, level of
cooperation throughout the game.
&RQFOXVLRQ
The altruism plus error hypothesis implies that repeated play should decrease
contribution, but this does not seem to be true. Or rather: it is true for free riders and for
reciprocators in non-homogeneous groups, but certainly not for cooperators and
reciprocators in homogeneous groups. Our evidence strongly supports the heterogeneous
agents hypothesis. This may not be relevant in DOO economic contexts, but it certainly is in
some (Heckman 2001a, 2001b). In particular, representative agent models (especially the
‘augmented’ ones with altruism18) may be perfectly adequate in many circumstances for
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 In the last few rounds the variance increases also among cooperators and reciprocators (the end-
effect is probably involved here), while it remains small and decreases to zero in the last round among
free riders.
18
 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
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predictive purposes, but lack explanatory depth and might fail to capture some important
mechanisms that sustain cooperation. This should have important consequences on the
experimental debate on repeated PG games. The divide between models of self-interested
agents on the one hand and models of altruistic players on the other, might never be
resolved simply because there are agent of both types. It seems more interesting and
fruitful to recognise not only the existence of these two types of players, but also their
influence on another (large) category of players: reciprocators (or ‘conditional
cooperators’).
Since reciprocators constitute a large portion of the experimental population (at least in
our sample, but see also Fischbacher et al., 2001)19, it is possible to raise the overall level
of contribution by forming homogeneous groups of players with similar attitudes towards
cooperation. Letting people choose their partners may be a key to the promotion of
cooperating behaviour.
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Figure 4 (a,b,c): Contribution in PG Game, Sessions 1 vs. 2, per type
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